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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 highlighted the importance of over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives in maintaining global financial stability. While the most common 
types of OTC derivatives (swaps, forwards, exotic options) did not cause this financial crisis, 
they significantly contributed to the spreading of the crisis beyond the US sub-prime 
mortgages market and transforming it into a global financial crisis. As a part of 
comprehensive financial reform legislation, important regulatory changes with respect to OTC 
derivatives market were called for to serve the “public interest”. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted in July 2010 and the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) proposed in September 2010 were legislative responses to 
this call for a new regulation of OTC derivatives markets.  
This paper contributes to the discussion of current OTC regulation reform by describing 
the major issues in the clearing of OTC derivatives and the current regulatory initiatives 
aimed at solving these problems. The core of the paper is the critical comparison of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation.  
The regulation of OTC derivatives is a subject of a number of recent studies by consulting 
firms and institutions, for example Clifford Chance (2010), EC (2010), Financial Stability 
Board (2010), Green and Jennings-Mares (2011), and Sherman and Sterling (2010), and by 
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academic authors Culp (2009), Duffie and Zhu (2010), de Meijer and Wilson (2010), 
Pirrong (2009), and Rausser, Balson, and Stevens (2010).  
Culp (2009) and de Meijer and Wilson (2010) explore the regulatory, operational, and 
economic aspects of the US regulation dealing with OTC derivatives clearing. Pirrong (2009) 
and Duffie and Zhu (2010) express some reservations, based on economic and financial 
theory, about particular aspects of the proposed OTC derivatives regulation. Pirrong (2009) 
argues that a comparative economic analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative default 
risk sharing mechanisms casts considerable doubt on the advisability of central clearing of 
credit derivatives since these products are likely to be subject to severe information 
asymmetry problems regarding their value, risk, and the creditworthiness of those who trade 
them. Such information asymmetries are likely to be less severe in bilateral markets than in 
centrally cleared systems. He also argues that although regulators have argued that clearing 
would reduce systemic risk, a more complete analysis demonstrates that clearing could 
actually increase risks to the broader financial system. Duffie and Zhu (2010) show in their 
model that it is more efficient to have one (or a low number) of central clearing counterparties 
(CCPs) than to allow for high number of independent CCPs. Rausser, Balson, and 
Stevens (2010) analyze a market microstructure necessary for successful operation of CCP 
and they outline a detailed framework for clearing of all OTC derivatives. Their approach is 
based on utilizing public-private partnerships to counter the potential concentration of risk 
and a default of a CCP, using the analytical framework developed by Rausser and 
Stevens (2009).  
Given the above background, the balance of this paper is structured as follows. The next 
section provides a brief introduction to the OTC derivatives and outlines major issues in the 
OTC derivatives market which have to be dealt with in the proposed regulatory frameworks. 
That section also introduces basic terminology which is used in the core section of this paper 
to highlight the key similarities and differences in US and EU approaches to OTC derivatives 
market regulation. The final section concludes by summarizing the main results of the paper 
and suggestions for further research.  
2 OTC Derivatives and their Clearing 
OTC derivatives include the following five broad classes of derivative securities: foreign 
exchange derivatives, interest rate derivatives, equity derivatives, commodity derivatives and 
credit derivatives. The most important class of contracts in the credit derivatives category is 
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credit default swaps. Out of these five segments of the OTC derivative market, the interest 
rate derivatives are clearly the largest one, the next largest being foreign exchange derivatives 
and credit derivatives. Fig. 1 reports the notational value of the stock of outstanding OTC 
derivatives from 1998 through June 2010.  
The derivative contract among two counterparties is a contractual relation which is in 
force over the whole duration period of the contract. This duration may range from a few days 
to a very long contract over several decades. During the lifetime of the contract, 
counterparties build up claims against each other, as the rights and obligations covered by the 
contract evolve as a function of its underlying assets. This leads to the possibility of 
counterparty credit risk, which is the risk that a counterparty may not fulfill its duties under 
the contract when they become due. Ineffective management of counterparty risk is one of the 
three main problems in the functioning of OTC derivatives market, the others being the lack 
of transparency on positions and exposures and ineffective mitigation of operational as well as 
systemic risk when one counterparty defaults cascading in defaults of other parties.  
The counterparty risk may be managed over time through clearing. This may be 
performed centrally, for example through a central clearing counterparty, or bilaterally. While 
both types of clearing are utilized for OTC derivatives, the bilateral clearing is the most used 
form. The most frequently used method of management of counterparty credit risk is the 
provision of collateral on the basis of a bilateral collateral agreement. Collateral serves as an 
effective insurance against excessive credit exposure if notational values are calculated 
frequently and accurately, if the collateral is effectively exchanged in a timely manner, if it 
offers a comprehensive coverage against overall potential counterparty credit risk exposure, 
and if it is legally enforceable in the event of the counterparty’s default. The majority of 
bilateral collateral arrangements provide only for the exchange of variation margin (covering 
fluctuations in the value of the contract), but not of initial margin (covering the potential cost 
of replacing the contract in case the original counterparty defaults).  
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Fig. 1: Global Amounts Outstanding of OTC Derivatives 
 
Source: BIS (2010) 
With respect to operational risk management, it is important to realize that an OTC 
derivative trade goes through many processing steps from the initial trading agreement of the 
parties thorough the confirmation of the transaction and further management of the OTC 
contract. The processes that have been developed to manage these steps are often quite 
complex and interconnected. Since the OTC derivative markets allow for a high level of 
flexibility in defining the economic and legal terms of derivatives contracts, there are a 
number of highly individualized and complex contracts in the market that still require 
significant manual intervention during their processing. The low level of standardization of 
OTC derivatives contracts and low automation of processes leads to high operational risk, i.e., 
the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes and systems.  
OTC derivatives are privately negotiated contracts and consequently any information 
concerning the contract and any of the counterparties is usually only available to the 
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contracting parties. One mechanism for changing the informationally opaque nature of the 
OTC derivatives markets is the establishment of trade repositories to which the information 
about the trades would be reported. An example of the well-established trade repository is the 
Warehouse Trust, which contains information on almost all outstanding credit default swaps 
(CDS).  
3 EU and US Comparison 
Both EU and US approaches to the regulation of OTC derivatives markets should be 
viewed in the light of the agreement of the G-20 leaders expressed during their Pittsburgh 
meeting in September 2009. This agreement specifies that all standardized OTC derivative 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, 
and cleared through central counterparties. The G-20 leaders also agreed that OTC derivative 
contracts should be reported to trade repositories.  
The Dodd-Frank Act and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) have 
essentially the same scope. Both include very general definitions allowing for most 
derivatives. In the US, foreign exchange swaps and forwards may be exempted by regulation. 
With respect to regulatory responsibilities, derivative trading in the EU continues to be 
regulated by relevant national regulators, and CCPs in the EU will come under the supervision 
of them too. The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) will have an important 
role including development of technical standards and overseeing non-EU CCPs. In the US, 
the Dodd-Frank Act allows for the distribution of regulatory responsibilities between the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) which is concerned with swaps and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which is concerned with security based swaps.  
As far as the timing of the introduction of both regulations is concerned, most provisions 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and relevant rules take effect by July 2011. The EU regulation is 
intended to be in force by 2012, and EU technical standards are due to be completed by 
ESMA by the end of June 2012.  
While the US and EU regulations are very similar, there exist some important differences 
between both approaches. These major differences are concerned with restrictions on bank 
proprietary trading, the separation of derivatives business from banking, mandatory exchange 
trading, and clearing organization ownership rules. In the following paragraphs we outline 
these differences in a more detail.  
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From the point of view of operations of commercial banks, the EU approach does not 
introduce any equivalent to the Dodd-Frank “push out” rule which restricts the derivatives 
trading activities of banks. Similarly there is no EU equivalent to the “Volckerrule” which 
restricts the proprietary trading operations of bank groups. As opposed to the US, there is also 
no provision which would allow regulators to restrict bank ownership of CCPs in the EU.  
The US “push out” rule means that as a condition for receiving certain governmental 
assistance, including access to the Federal Reserve’s discount (lending) window, banks will 
be required to move certain derivatives into a separately capitalized affiliate. There are limited 
exceptions available for US FDIC-insured banks for hedging activities and derivatives 
involving certain permitted assets for banks (such as interest rate and currency derivatives). 
These exemptions are not currently available for uninsured US branches of non-US banks.  
The “Volcker Rule” prohibits proprietary trading in many derivative instruments by some 
regulated financial institutions and affiliates. The proprietary trading includes engaging as 
principal for the trading account of the banking entity in any transaction to purchase or sell or 
otherwise acquire or dispose of securities, derivatives, contracts for sale of a commodity for 
future delivery or engage in option trading. The following permitted trading-related activities 
are allowed as exceptions to the “Volcker Rule”. Banking entities may engage in proprietary 
trading of obligations of the US or any agency, Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, a Federal Home 
Loan Bank, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac, a Farm Credit System institution, and municipal 
obligations. They may also engage in underwriting and market-making-related activities in 
securities that otherwise are prohibited for proprietary trading, but they may acquire inventory 
only to the extent necessary to meet the “reasonably expected near term demands” of 
customers. Other exceptions are hedging or similar risk mitigation activities that are designed 
to reduce the specific risks arising from or related to covered instruments. The banks are 
allowed to purchase or sell covered instruments on behalf of customers. The banking entities 
are allowed investments in certain small business companies and other investments to 
promote the public welfare. They may undertake investments in covered instruments by an 
insurance company and its affiliates for the company’s general account. Banking entities may 
engage in proprietary trading by non-US entities outside of the US. Banking entities may sell 
or securitize (but not buy) loans.  
Of all these exceptions, the market making exception seems to be one of the major 
loopholes of the Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule also prohibits banking entities from 
sponsoring or investing in hedge funds and private equity funds. This restriction is again 
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subject to a number of exceptions. Sponsoring in the context of the Volcker Rule means 
serving as a general partner, managing member or trustee; controlling a fund through the 
power to elect a majority of directors, trustees or management; or sharing the name or a 
variant of the same name with the fund.  
A very important institutional difference between the two regulatory approaches is that the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires that transactions that are subject to the clearing requirement are also 
subject to the mandatory exchange trading requirement. They have to be executed on a 
regulated exchange or a registered swap execution facility (SEF), which is a new category of 
regulated multilateral trading facility. The trading requirement does not apply if the 
transaction is exempt from the clearing requirement or if no exchange or SEF makes the swap 
available for trading. The EU does not currently propose to have an exchange trading 
requirement for derivatives, but such a provision may be considered in the framework of the 
EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) review.  
The last major area of differences between US and EU approaches are the clearing 
organization ownership rules. In the US, the CFTC and SEC have proposed rules under the 
Dodd-Frank Act that would limit the ownership of voting equity on clearing organizations by 
clearing members and other financial entities. Under this proposal, a CCP would have to 
comply with one of two alternative limits. One limit is that no member may own more than 20 
percent of the voting equity, and specialized financial entities (whether members or not) may 
not own more than 40 percent of the voting equity in the aggregate. The alternative limit is 
that no specified financial entity (whether or not a member) may own more than 5 percent of 
the voting equity. In the EU approach, holders of significant shareholdings, direct or indirect, 
must be notified to the regulator, which may refuse authorization of the CCP if it does not 
consider such shareholders to be suitable (taking into account the need to ensure the sound 
and prudent management of the CCP). There are no specific rules in the EU on holdings by 
members and none are included in the proposed European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR). While the EU has not proposed numerical ownership limits on clearing 
organizations, in practice it may apply similar standards as in the US.  
Both US and EU regulations impose central counterparties clearing and trade repositories 
on a broadly defined class of OTC derivatives, with some differences and exemptions. They 
both leave the final decision whether the clearing obligation applies for a particular class of 
OTC to the assigned regulator.  
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The EU clearing obligations are potentially easier on end-users than under US legislation. 
In the EU, all financial counterparties who deal with other financial counterparties are subject 
to clearing. Non-financial counterparties have to satisfy the clearing requirements only when 
their positions (excluding certain hedges) are higher than a clearing threshold. This is a less 
restrictive approach than in the US, where everyone who trades an eligible contract has to 
clear the contract. The only exception under US legislation is when non-financial subjects 
engage in some hedging transactions.  
Similarly, the EU approach is easier on end-users with respect to collateralisation of the 
uncleared contracts. Under the EU legislation only financial counterparties and non-financial 
counterparties who are under clearing obligation have to ensure an appropriately segregated 
exchange of collateral or an appropriate and proportionate holding of capital for uncleared 
transactions. Under the US legislation, all dealers and major swap participants engaged in 
uncleared transactions are subject to margin requirements. There is no explicit exemption for 
transactions with end-users under the US legislation. Nevertheless US legislators have 
indicated that the margins will not be required from the end-users, many of which will be 
engaged in hedging transactions.  
Some of the problems of OTC markets in the EU are covered not by a recently proposed 
EU regulation but by the current review of EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID). So while the US approach requires the execution of OTC derivatives subject to the 
clearing obligation on a swap execution facility or designated contract market, real time post-
trade transparency for cleared derivatives trades and position limits, in the EU these issues are 
covered separately in the framework of the MiFID review.  
Both EU and US approaches include registration and conduct of business rules for dealers 
(the EU actually already had these rules under MiFID directive). The US approach extends 
registration, conduct of business and margin/capital rules to “major swap participants”. The 
EU approach only imposes limited rules (but including margin/capital requirements) on non-
financial counterparties which are subject to the clearing obligation.  
Both the US and EU approaches facilitate cross-border clearing since they include 
recognition/exemption of non-domestic CCPs. With respect to repositories, both the US and 
EU are less favorable in their cross-border provisions. The US requires from repositories 
compliance with full US requirements. EU will provide recognition of non-EU repositories 
conditional on conclusion of a treaty.  
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Finally, because of different legal cultures in the EU and US, the US approach provides 
regulators with greater flexibility in dealing with unintended consequences through rule-
making and other powers.  
4 Conclusions 
When fully effective, the European and American derivatives regulations, EMIR and the 
Dodd-Frank Act, will introduce important changes to both the regulation and structure of the 
OTC derivatives markets in the US and Europe. While the overall approach both in the US 
and the EU is very similar, there are certain differences in the regulatory approach taken in 
these two jurisdictions. These differences may lead to the possibility of regulatory arbitrage 
and in some cases they may lead to conflicting or inconsistent requirements due to their 
extraterritorial impacts. Nevertheless the final shape of the new OTC derivatives markets will 
depend on implementing rules and regulations. Therefore the regulatory authorities will be 
important players in this stage of the broad regulatory game, and they will have wide scope 
and authority to interpret key provisions of the underlying legislation.  
The major similarities between EMIR and the Dodd-Frank Act are in the mandatory clearing 
for standardized contracts, in the scope of the derivatives covered, in exemptions from 
clearing for end-users and in the reporting of cleared and uncleared (OTC) derivative 
transactions by nearly all financial counterparties. The major differences are the restrictions 
on bank proprietary trading, the separation of derivative trading activities from commercial 
banking activities, CCP ownership rules, and the establishment of a mandatory exchange 
trading requirement.  
At this stage we have only reviewed the institutional description of the differences and 
similarities in US and EU approaches to the regulation of OTC derivatives both of which 
move in the direction of G-20 consensus to provide higher stability and transparency for OTC 
derivatives trading. A possible extension of this paper would be an inclusion of other 
important countries into this comparison. The obvious candidates for this extension would be 
Japan, Singapore and China (Hong Kong). In Japan, a new law amending the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act was passed in May 2010 making CCP clearing compulsory for 
a wide class of OTC derivatives. The initiative to establish a local CCP for derivatives has 
been launched in Hong Kong, and the Singapore Exchange Derivative Clearing Limited is in 
the process of introducing a new trade registration system for the registration of interest rate 
swaps and Asian foreign exchange forwards. Another extension would be to investigate the 
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connections between OTC derivatives regulation and global regulatory standards on bank 
capital adequacy and liquidity under the Basel III framework. The connection between OTC 
derivatives regulation and banking regulation is potentially interesting given the current major 
difference between EMIR and the Dodd-Frank Act in the area of proprietary trading of banks 
and banking groups.  
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American and European Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivative 
Securities 
Karel JANDA – Gordon RAUSSER 
ABSTRACT  
This paper describes the major issues in the clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
and the current regulative initiatives aimed at removing the market opaqueness. The core of 
the paper is the comparison of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). The similarities 
and the major differences of these two regulative approaches are emphasized. The major 
similarities between EMIR and the Dodd-Frank Act relate to the mandatory clearing for 
standardized contracts, the scope of the derivatives covered, the exemptions from clearing for 
end-users and the reporting of cleared and uncleared derivative transactions by nearly all 
financial counterparties. The major differences arise with the restrictions on bank proprietary 
trading, with separation of derivative trading activities from commercial banking activities, 
with central counterparties (CCP) ownership rules and with the establishment of mandatory 
exchange trading requirement. 
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